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Abstract: 
This is to provide empirical evidence on the likely roles of knowledge, social networks 
and Information Technologies (IT) besides governance in shaping the characteristics of the 
current generation of youth in comparison with the oldest ones. The framework of 
intergenerational mobility provides promising grounds for the empirical analysis.  Series of 
hypotheses require empirical testing under the above framework. The data are mainly time 
series from international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Labor 
Organizations and United Nations. In addition, results from previous studies assessing 
educational mobility and income are used. Several statistical methods provide the grounds for 
the testing of the retained hypotheses. The attained results show that the effects of annual 
demographic growth is not established clearly for all Arab countries as most economies have 
had immobility in demographic population growth over the period 1960-2015 but the total 
population of youth in the current generation is higher than the population that prevailed for the 
older generation. The overall openness of the Arab economies besides their democratization 
measured by series of indices appear to have been stable over the period 1996-2015. Other 
results are related to social mobility in income, education attainment and to the unemployment 
trends. They all show with the progress in ICTs and the increasing reliability on social media, 
that the current generation has more features that are different from those of the oldest 
generation.  
JEL: J62; I25. 
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Introduction 
Youngest segments of the population in each economy are known to be the major engine 
of economic, social and political change. This is confirmed by the continuous historical 
peaceful and non-peaceful transformations described through human history. Even today and 
in the future, youth is and will be the major source of social, economic and political changes. 
The only difference between current and past eras resides in the speed, frequency and directions 
of societal transformations that are relatively quicker and higher under current generations.  
Nowadays, the relatively highest access to knowledge and to Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) with highest probabilities of belongings to operational 
and large networks, provide economies of scale and higher cost effectiveness in information 
gathering and problem solving within higher dimensional sets of solutions backed up by the 
large network size. This new real and virtual evidence supports the higher potential that is likely 
to be expressed by current and future generations in comparison with the oldest ones.  
But these trends are likely to be varying from one country and to the other and from one 
group of countries to other regions. There are indeed variations in historical, geographic and 
cultural endowments and values. This may be affecting the dynamics of change in relation to 
the importance and characterization of the values owned by the newest and oldest generations.  
The latest related research on Arab countries shows that there are specificities for the 
role and dynamics of the youngest population segment in this part of the world. The latest 
contribution related to generation gap (Harkat, Driouchi, & Achehboune, 2016) assesses the 
link between unemployment, education, ICTs variables and their implications on the political 
stability within Arab economies. Findings indicate that both unemployment and education 
among youth in Arab countries increase the political instability while this latter is significantly 
caused by the unemployment. The contribution of Azeng and Yogo (2013) shows similar 
findings. In addition to that, empirical results indicate that political instability is also related to 
high socioeconomic inequalities and high corruption. This is the case for many Arab countries 
such as Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia (Ghafar, 2016). 
Recent research shows also the differences in political attitudes towards changes as 
related to different generations. Findings indicate that the youngest segments in Arab countries 
do not follow the traditional political participation scheme but use newer and innovative forms 
of political contribution (Cole, 2015; Quintelier, 2007; Shelley, Thrane, & Shulman, 2004). 
This research aims at analyzing the likely characteristics of the youngest population 
segments in Arab countries with regard to economic, social and political change in comparison 
with oldest generations. While doing that, it is well understood that the current generation of 
youth is relatively better endowed with knowledge, higher level of access to information and 
communication technology in addition to current youth segments that are parts of larger social 
networks and social media as allowed by the current information and communication 
technologies. Such facts and trends are first described through descriptive statistics with related 
tests of hypotheses to underline the on-going evidence about change and allocations. 
The objective of this research is to establish and set the empirical evidence for the role 
of the youngest segments in Arab countries in relation to the characteristics of older generations.  
The current paper starts with a literature review. It continues with showing the major 
hypotheses to be tested empirically before the introduction of the methods and the data. The 
paper ends with the presentation of the results and with the discussion of the major attainments.  
I. Literature Review 
Research on generations has been focusing on youngest segments as to understand the 
determinants associated with their decisions and to predict their behavior (Harkat, Driouchi, 
Achehboune, 2016). Cole (2015) defines the generation Y, or Millennials, in Arab economies 
as different from all the previous generations due to massive usage of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) among this segment. Due to the availability and easiness 
for accessing these ICTs, youth nowadays are more connected in social networks. In the case 
of Tunisia, Facebook users doubled in a period of two years to reach 10 million people in 2008. 
This is also the case for Egypt, Libya, and other countries. 
For Arab countries, Binzel and Carvalho (2015), Binzel (2011), Ragui, Krafft, Roemer, 
and Salehi-Isfahani, (2016), Ragui and Saleh (2013) in addition to Salehi-Isfahan, Belhaj-
Hassine, and Ragui, (2014) have contributions related to different dimensions of the social 
context of Arab countries.  But, the papers of Driouchi and Gamar (2016) and Driouchi and 
Harkat (2016) are directly related to this current research as they assess intergenerational 
mobility and inequalities in educational attainment and income in Arab countries. The attained 
results in the latter papers, indicate the large discrepancies that Arab countries face between 
high educational attainment, low income mobility and high unemployment.  
In addition to that, other research (Driouchi and Gamar, 2014) indicates the increasing 
trend in knowledge among youth in Arab economies while assessing the relationship between 
the social context and the enterprise creation. The level of enterprise creation in Arab countries 
is very low and has a direct negative impact on the unemployment. This also aligns with the 
contribution of Driouchi (2015) related to the threats of unemployment and skills obsolescence 
for the qualified labor among the youngest segment. The results indicate that the youngest 
segments in Arab countries face the challenges of the lack of prospective policies and low level 
of job creation. Driouchi and Malki (2011) show the tragedy of anti-commons in enterprise 
creation of the Arab countries that directly relate to the generation Y, as it limits the creation of 
job opportunities, development, and expansion of the economies. 
Salehi-Isfahan (2015) updates the earlier literature on youth transitions based on the 
evidence on inequality of opportunity. Salehi-Isfahan, Belhaj-Hassine, and Ragui, (2014) have 
ensured the first empirical investigation of inequality of education opportunities in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) based on data from tests administered by the international 
consortium Trends In Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) for a number of countries and 
over time since 1999.  Ragui & Saleh (2013) examine the effect of increased local supply of 
schooling on intergenerational mobility in education in Jordan using a unique data set that links 
individual data on own schooling and parents’ schooling for adults, from a household survey, 
with the supply of schooling in the sub-district of birth, from Jordanian Ministry of Education 
data. Chusseau, Hellier and Ben-Halima (2012) review the literature on the impacts of several 
dimensions of education on intergenerational inequality persistence. Ramadan, Hlasny, and 
Intini, (2015) find that inequality is high and growing across the Arab region. The empirical 
evidence gathered shows that this process is already started in most economies of the Arab 
region, but needs to be further supported to ensure economic and social mobility with the quality 
of the human resources required for growth and development. Different authors such as Sika 
(2011), Bibi and Nabli, (2010) have devoted research to the situation of Arab countries. 
With regards to the political change within economies, many historians and economist 
shed lights on the importance of the youth and the social media in the Arab Spring. Many has 
argued to innovative political implications of the youth that were not made the traditional way 
such as the case of the anti-government young people in Tunisia back in 2011 (Cole, 2015). 
The traits of this new generation vary from the previous ones, as this new generation is driven 
by self-interest. This implies the change of reforms initiated by young people due to the threats 
of the macroeconomic variables (Harkat, Driouchi, Achehboune, 2016). 
II. Research Hypotheses  
Series of hypotheses could be formulated and submitted to empirical tests. The possible 
hypotheses are:  
4.1: The demographic hypothesis: The basic hypothesis is that there is no change 
throughout generations, in demographic profiles by opposition to change in the 
youngest segments of the population. Under the null hypothesis, demography is not the 
driver of change but there are other factors that are emphasized in the other following 
hypotheses.  
4.2: The democratization hypothesis: Through time, the rate of democratization could 
be tested to be stagnating or increasing. This allows for the understanding of social, 
economic and political change in relation to democratization. Sub-indices such 
introduced by Kaufmann (World Bank) could be also supporting series of sub-
hypotheses related to governance and corruption.  
4.3: The external attractiveness hypothesis: This hypothesis tests for the migration 
drivers as being from the enhanced economic situation of the destination countries. 
Countries indicators in the World Bank will support testing for the relationship between 
the migration process, job opportunities, and macroeconomic variables. 
4.4: The generational knowledge hypothesis: Here different measures of knowledge 
could be used to help test any change in knowledge in relation to economic, social and 
political change. Educational attainment can be also a way for testing the role of 
knowledge. Previous research results can be used. 
4.5: The Information & Communication Technologies and generational change: The 
availability, access and use of ICTs are among the factors that enhance communication. 
This includes computers, software and telecommunications means.  
4.6: The social media and networking hypothesis: ICTs and mainly communicating 
means allow exchange of data and information. They also allow quick consultations for 
individual and groups. Larger networks allow for richer communication and exchange 
possibilities. They can also provide higher and better quality decisions.  
4.7: The unemployment issue and the lower share of employed skilled labor. 
  
III. Methods and Data    
Based on the hypotheses to be tested, series of variables appear to be critical for this 
research. The variables include the demographics of youth, the knowledge and education 
variables in addition to ICT related variables (access and use) with their related social media 
and networks. In addition, macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and economic 
growth are mobilized. Descriptive statistical analysis is conducted overall the hypotheses 
retained. Time series analysis is also applied for time series data where each series is divided 
into two subseries to capture at least two generations that are the new and the old. Regression 
analysis is also used to finalize the testing of some hypotheses.  
The sources of data include World Bank, UNESCO and ILO databases. These sources 
provide also macroeconomic variables. Other sources of secondary data are also used to account 
for the needed length and relevance of each time series. The World Population Data sheet is 
highlighting data related to Unemployment of ages 15-24 covering the period of 2005-2010 and 
labor force participation rate for ages 15-24 in 2010 with gender rates clarifications.   
 
IV. Results and Discussion     
The results to be attained will allow for the understanding of the dynamics of social, 
economic and political changes under the lens of intergenerational mobility in series of 
resources such as education and networking as permitted by information and communication 
technologies.  
4.1: The demographic hypothesis: The basic hypothesis is that there is no change 
throughout generations, in demographic profiles by opposition to change in the youngest 
segments of the population. Under the alternative hypothesis, demography is the driver of 
change but there are other factors that are emphasized in the other following hypotheses. 
According to the Arab Human Development Report (UNDP, 2016), the demographic fact is 
that the current youth generation is the largest youth cohort this region has had over the past 
50 years, making up 30% of its population of 370 million.  
Figure 1: Arab population change for the 15-64 age group. 
  
As to test for the population change, the population of the group age between 15 and 
64 years old for Arab economies was collected from the World Bank of the period between 
1960 and 2015. The data is divided into two main generations in which each generation 
covers 27 years. The first generation, or G0, is between 1960 and 1987, and the second 
generation, or G1, is between 1988 and 2015. Figure 1 shows the average age of each 
generation for each of the Arab countries and indicates that the population change in all the 
Arab economies at least doubled with the highest increase in the United Arab Emirates, 
followed by Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, with the multipliers of 8.00, 5.82, 2.68, and 2.42, 
respectively.  This implies that the newer generation exhibits higher level of population than 
the previous one. 
4.2: The democratization hypothesis and change: Through time, the rate of democratization 
could be tested to be stagnating or increasing. This allows for the understanding of social, 
economic and political change in relation to democratization. Sub-indices such introduced by 
Kaufmann (World Bank) could be also supporting series of sub-hypotheses related to 
governance and corruption.  
The data related to governance measures was collected from the World Bank and 
account for 5 main variables that are: political stability and absence of violence/ terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The data 
is available for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) is an index that summarizes its composites to show views on the 
governance quality of more than 200 economies from surveys of households and firms, 
commercial business information providers, non-governmental organizations, and public sector 
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organizations. The aggregate WGI indicators have values that range between -2.5 and 2.5, or 
from lower to better governance. 
The descriptive analysis show that most of the indicators express stationary processes 
over the period 1996-2015 and that no major changes are exhibited by the governance 
indicators. The results are shown below for each index respectively.  
Figure 2: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism in the Arab Countries 
 
Concerning the political stability and absence of violence or terrorism, it is an estimation 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized by violent means, including political 
terrorism or any other unconstitutional means. For this measure, only Algeria, Qatar, and Sudan 
indicate an increasing pattern while Sudan account for low values in which the highest is -2.17. 
Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates show a relatively stable pattern. For all the 
remaining Arab economies, they illustrate a decreasing trend, meaning that these economies 
tend to more political instability and an increase in the violence and terrorism. 
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Figure 3: Government Effectiveness in the Arab World 
 
 With regard to the government effectiveness measure, it gives incentives on the 
relationship between the quality of both the public and civil services. This measure also shows 
the relationship between these latter variables and the political pressure. In addition to that, this 
indicator shows the formulation, implementation, and commitment of the governments to 
policies. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Iraq, and Palestine indicate an 
increasing patter with negative value for the three latter countries. For Bahrain, Jordan, and 
Libya, they show a stable patter while for all the other remaining countries they indicate a 
decreasing pattern. 
Figure 4: Regulatory Quality in Arab Countries. 
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The regulatory quality summarizes the ability of a government to support private sector 
development by updating, formulating and implementing new laws and regulations. The 
regulatory quality in the Arab countries indicate an increasing trend for Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Palestine, and a stable pattern for Jordan 
and Morocco. Decreasing patterns are noticed in all the remaining countries. 
Figure 5: Rule of law in Arab countries. 
 
The rule of law indicator summarizes many components that concern the level of 
confidence in regulatory authorities such as the police, property rights, and the courts. It also 
shows the level of crime within economies. This indicator shows increasing trends for Algeria, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and Sudan, and shows stable patterns for Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. All the remaining Arab countries indicate decreasing 
trends. 
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Figure 6: Control of corruption in Arab countries. 
 
The control of corruption indicates the power exercised by the public sector on private 
gains. This indicator shows increasing patterns for Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates, and indicates stable patterns for Bahrain, Iraq, Tunisia, and Palestine. 
4.3: Attractiveness of outside models of change with emphasis on net migration: This 
hypothesis tests for the migration drivers as being from the enhanced economic situation of the 
destination countries. Countries indicators in the World Bank will support testing for the 
relationship between the migration process, job opportunities, and macroeconomic variables. 
In order to test for the migration through generations in Arab countries the net migration 
variables is used. The net migration accounts for the total number of immigrants minus the 
number of emigrants, meaning the inflow minus the outflow of both citizens and non-citizens. 
The data is extracted from the World Bank and is based on each five years estimate for the 
period between 1962 and 2012. A negative value of the net migration implies that citizens are 
leaving their home countries to other destination countries, while the opposite implies that the 
country attracts individuals. 
Figure 7 indicates that Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Palestine, and Yemen have negative values, which indicate that the citizens of these countries 
have high tendencies to emigrate to other host countries and implies the outflow of the skilled 
labor. All the remaining variables have positive net migration values. 
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Figure 7 shows the trends of the net migration of the Arab countries. Increasing patterns 
implies that the inflow of citizens is increasing within the concerned economies, and decreasing 
patterns indicate the opposite. Countries with increasing trends are: Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Iraq since 1987, Kuwait since 
1992, Lebanon since 1997, and Tunisia since 2002. All the remaining economies have negative 
trends with major fluctuations. 
Figure 7: Net migration in Arab countries. 
 
 In order to understand the migration change among Arab generations, a regression 
analysis was performed. Since the data is per five years, an assumption of a similar pattern or 
value for each of the following four years has been made. Thus, the data was separated into two 
main generations: Gold, which is the generation between the years 1960 and 1987, and Gnew, 
which is the generation between 1988 and 2015. 
The regression model is given as: 
𝐺𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝜀 
Where: 
𝛼: is the intercept; 
𝛽: is the coefficient; 
𝜀: is the standard error. 
-5000000
-4000000
-3000000
-2000000
-1000000
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
Years
Total Net Migration in Arab Countries
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Mauritania
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
South Sudan
Sudan
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
West Bank and Gaza
Yemen, Rep.
The R-squared of all the models ranges between the values of 0.001 and 0.501. Table 1 
summarizes all these model results. 
Table 1: Regression results of migration in Arab countries 
Country R-squared Intercept Coefficient 
Algeria 0.039 
 -228 928.59                                       
(-6.301) 
-0.182                                
(-1.031) 
Bahrain 0.439 
 -439.65                             
(-0.114) 
0.118                                
(4.519) 
Egypt 0.267 
 -539 749.47                             
(-7.116) 
-0.874                               
(-3.079) 
Iraq 0.316 
 -105 466.00                                
(-4.506) 
-0.207                               
(-3.469) 
Jordan 0.001 
 55 548.94                                
(2.195) 
-0.014                                
(-0.159) 
Kuwait 0.501 
 128 610.10                                 
(41.118) 
-0.041                   
(-5.108) 
Lebanon 0.302 
 -64 136.48                                  
(-2.875) 
-0.138                              
(-3.351) 
Libya 0.215 
 55 226.55                                  
(10.848) 
-0.070                 
(-2.668) 
Mauritania 0.017 
 -7 437.16                         
(-5.456) 
0.042                         
(0.672) 
Morocco 0.129 
 -201 534.46                           
(-2.439) 
0.306                              
(1.958) 
Oman 0.216 
 21 672.56                          
(2.947) 
 0.042                               
(2.679) 
Qatar 0.292 
 25 872.05                         
(3.979) 
 0.054                               
(3.272) 
Saudi Arabia 0.456 
 168 294.02                             
(1.457) 
 0.820                         
(4.667) 
South Sudan 0.042 
 22 755.92                            
(1.162) 
 0.029                            
(1.064) 
Sudan 0.330 
 72 532.49                         
(4.755) 
-0.074                     
(-3.579) 
Syria 0.033 
 -66 519.60                             
(-5.709) 
0.007                  
(0.945) 
Tunisia 0.104 
 -68 920.81                        
(-4.617) 
-0.291                              
(-1.734) 
UAE 0.389 
 99 092.78                            
(3.671) 
 0.069                              
(4.068) 
Yemen 0.006 
 -158 172.81                             
(-6.959) 
0.031                     
(0.396) 
 
Table 1 shows the regression results of the net migration of the old generation versus 
the new generation. The coefficient of Algeria, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, South Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen are not significant. This means that there is no significant 
relationship among the behavior of previous generations and newer ones in the Arab economies, 
and this is explained by the fluctuation shown in Figure 7. 
Arab economies that have a positive and significant trend are Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. All of these latter countries indicate a similar 
positive trend of net migration between older and newer generations. For countries that have 
negative and significant coefficients indicate a negative relationship of net migration between 
older and newer generations, and are divided into two main categories. The firs category relates 
to countries in which older generations have an increasing net migration trend while the newer 
generations indicate the opposite. These countries are Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. For Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Lebanon, older generations shows a decreasing net migration patterns while newer 
generations shows increasing patterns. 
4.4: The Intergenerational gaps in income, unemployment and educational attainments 
This part is taken from previous contributions of Driouchi (2016) and Harkat and Driouchi 
(2016). The following tables are thus extracted from the results of these previous contributions.  
4.4.1: Income Mobility: This respectively measured by per capita GDP, GNP and by the 
adjusted net national income. 
4.4.1.1: Intergenerational economic mobility measured by per capita GDP (constant 
2005 US dollars) for Arab countries 
Countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Libya appear to be exhibiting higher elasticity 
in relation to intergenerational economic mobility. This shows a high level of 
intergenerational immobility with respect to GDP per capita. All the other Arab countries 
show lower elasticity implying higher mobility throughout generations. 
 
Table 2: Intergenerational economic mobility measured by per capita GDP 
(constant 2005 US dollars) for Arab countries 
 
    tcritical  
Countries Coefficient t-statistic N 0.05 0.01  
Algeria 0.3282 4.8179 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
Bahrain -0.2269 -4.9613 21 1.721 2.518 ** 
Egypt 0.7203 25.6032 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
Iraq 0.4138 2.0939 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
Jordan -0.2408 -1.0474 30 1.697 2.457 NS 
Kuwait -0.4230 -1.5900 15 1.753 2.602 
  
NS 
Lebanon 0.2099 1.3057 20 1.725 2.528 NS 
Libya -1.9312 -3.0007 10 1.812 2.764 * 
Mauritania -0.1655 -1.0866 30 1.697 2.457 NS 
Morocco 0.9403 14.6829 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
Oman 0.0947 8.3406 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
Qatar 0.4407 2.0843 10 1.812 2.764 *** 
Saudi Arabia -0.1951 -2.1746 30 1.697 2.457 ** 
Sudan -0.4804 -0.7625 30 1.697 2.457 NS 
Syria  0.3404 6.7835 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
Tunisia 0.8947 11.9229 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
UAE 0.5133 2.7617 30 1.697 2.457 *** 
West Bank  0.2616 2.5118 15 1.753 2.602 *** 
Yemen -0.0149 -0.0572 15 1.753 2.602 NS 
 
Notes 
***School attainment of children related to that of parents with statistically significant elasticity that is less than one. This is 
a stationary process at the given level of significance. There are countries that have low elasticity such as Oman and Lebanon. 
This means that the white noise is the most important driver of mobility. But, Morocco has a coefficient that is close to one 
implying that this close to a random walk process.  
**Coefficient negative and less than one the process depends negatively on past but it is covariance stationary 
*This is an evolutionary process but with oscillations (negative value) in the case of Libya. 
NS: the coefficients are statistically non-significant implying that the process is only a while noise.  
4.4.1.2: Intergenerational economic mobility measured by GNI per capita (constant 2005 
US$) for Arab Countries 
 
When using GNI per capita, Egypt and Morocco and Sudan, appear to be showing with 
high statistical significance, higher elasticity as a signal of immobility of the economic status 
across generations. The other few countries left have elasticity estimate not statistically 
different from zero. This means that the estimates attained indicate that the economic status of 
newer generations is mainly driver by a while noise and no link could be established with the 
economic situation of the older generation. 
 
 
Table 3: Intergenerational economic mobility measured by GNI per capita (constant 2005 US$) 
for Arab Countries 
Countries Coefficient t-statistics N 
tcritical 
5% 1% 
Algeria 0.1093 1.0568 30 1.697 2.4457 
Egypt 1.4356** 29.4765 30 1.697 2.4457 
Jordan -0.0981 -0.2927 30 1.697 2.4457 
Lebanon -0.1549 -0.2454 15 1.753 2.6020 
Morocco 1.7220** 15.8550 30 1.697 2.4457 
Sudan -1.2729 -1.6255 30 1.697 2.4457 
 
4.4.1.3: Intergenerational economic mobility measured by the adjusted net national 
income per capita (current US$) for Arab countries 
 
When attempting the use of the adjusted net national income per capita, it appears that 
Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, Qatar and Yemen have higher immobility in 
economic intergenerational transfers.  
 
Table 4: Intergenerational economic mobility measured by the adjusted net national income per 
capita (current US$) for Arab countries 
 
Countries  Coefficient t-statistics N 
t-critical 
5% 1% 
Algeria 0.3862 1.2407 25 1.708 2.485 
Bahrain 1.2191** 10.1332 25 1.708 2.485 
Egypt 3.3073** 6.8418 25 1.708 2.485 
Jordan 0.4450 0.9975 25 1.708 2.485 
Kuwait 0.2330 0.4319 25 1.708 2.485 
Lebanon 0.7473** 3.6205 20 1.725 2.528 
Mauritania 0.4095** 3.7975 30 1.697 2.457 
Morocco 1.7043** 8.7444 30 1.697 2.457 
Oman 1.3290** 4.4388 30 1.697 2.457 
Qatar 1.0394* 1.7620 30 1.697 2.457 
Saudi Arabia 0.0947 0.3166 30 1.697 2.457 
Syria -0.3744* -2.3672 30 1.697 2.457 
Tunisia 1.7313** 14.5837 30 1.697 2.457 
Yemen 1.1814** 5.5450 20 1.725 2.528 
 
4.4.2: Elasticity for intergenerational mobility in educational attainment 
 
All Arab countries appear to have estimated elasticity that is highly statistically 
significant and below one at the exception of Mauritania where the estimated coefficient is 
around one. This implies that all countries except Mauritania exhibit higher mobility for 
educational attainment meaning that new generations are enjoying higher attainment compared 
to the older ones. Mauritania appears to be at the limit as it has lower mobility in educational 
attainment.  
Table 5: Elasticity for intergenerational mobility in educational attainment in Arab countries 
Country Independent  R² Obsevations 
Algeria 
0.6429 
(4.5721) 
0.7491 10 
Bahrain 
0.3778 
(5.8349) 
0.8295 10 
Egypt 
0.7496 
(7.2206) 
0.8816 10 
Iraq 
0.5099 
(14.4771) 
0.9677 10 
Jordan 
0.6916 
(17.7490) 
0.9783 10 
Kuwait 
0.4856 
(5.8311) 
0.8293 10 
Libya 
0.5952 
(8.1222) 
0.9040 10 
Mauritania 
1.0514 
(13.8059) 
0.9646 10 
Morocco 
0.6699 
(17.8472) 
0.9785 10 
Qatar 
0.5902 
(11.9104) 
0.9530 10 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.7800 
(9.7937) 
0.9320 10 
Syria 
0.5663 
(7.6956) 
0.8943 10 
Sudan 
0.7779 
(8.2241) 
0.9062 10 
Tunisia 
0.6551 
(12.3391) 
0.9560 10 
UAE 
0.6991 
(13.4366) 
0.9627 10 
Yemen 
0.9469 
(4.5720) 
0.7491 10 
(all estimated coefficients statistically highly significant) 
4.4.3. Unemployment Processes 
Most Arab countries have unemployment rate processes that are non-stationary with 
estimated autoregressive of order one (AR,1) process and with coefficient higher or equal to 1. 
These countries include Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and UAE but all have low 
unemployment average rate. Saudi Arabia with a low unemployment rate shows a stationary 
process for unemployment rate. Other countries such as Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Sudan and 
Yemen do show explosive pattern for their unemployment rates. But Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, 
Tunisia and West Bank/Gaza exhibit very high unemployment rates.  
Table 6: Unemployment Processes in Arab Countries 
 
Country AR(1) coefficient Stationarity Average rate 
unemployment 
Observations on 
unemployment 
Algeria 0.98 Stationary 19.72 Very high 
Bahrain 1.00 Non 7.11 Low 
Egypt 1.01 Non 10.04 Exploding 
Iraq 0.98 Stationary 18.71 Very high 
Jordan 0.99 Stationary 14.30 High 
Kuwait 1.03 Non 1.44 Low 
Lebanon 0.98 Stationary 7.71 High 
Libya 1.00 Non 19.52 Exploding 
Mauritania 1.00 Non 21.87 Exploding 
Morocco 0.98 Stationary 10.94 Very high 
Oman 1.00 Non 7.99 High 
Qatar 0.99 Stationary 0.60 Low 
Saudi Ar. 0.99 Stationary 5.55 Low 
Sudan 1.00 Stationary 14.98 Exploding 
Syria 0.99 Stationary 9.32 High 
Tunisia 0.99 Stationary 14.74 Very high 
UAE 1.00 Non 3.17 Low 
West 
Bank/Gaza 
0.99 Stationary 22.73 Very high 
Yemen 1.00 Non 14.75 Exploding 
4.5: The Information & Communication Technologies and Social Media: The availability 
and access to ICTs are among the factors that enhance knowledge ownership with possibilities 
of quicker transformations. This includes computers, software and telecommunications means.  
In order to assess the usage of ICTs and social media in the Arab countries, data is 
extracted from the World Bank and accounts for both the percentage of use of Internet and the 
percentage of cellular mobile subscriptions in Arab countries. The data is of the period between 
1990 and 2015. Figure 8 shows the trends of Internet usage. All Arab countries have increasing 
patterns with the highest values in Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and the lowest 
values in Mauritania, Iraq, and Libya. 
Figure 8: Internet users per 100 individuals in Arab countries 
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With regards to the cellular mobile subscriptions, all Arab countries indicate increasing 
trends, with the highest values for Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Jordan, and with the 
lowest values for Syria, Yemen, and Sudan. 
Figure 9: Mobile cellular subscription per 100 individuals in Arab countries 
 
 Concerning the social media in the Arab countries, the Dubai School of Government’s 
Governance and Innovation Program gathers data in all the 22 Arab countries. The data gives 
quantitative information about Facebook penetration rate, number of Facebook users, Twitter 
penetration rate, number of active users of Twitter, LinkedIn penetration rate, and LinkedIn 
number of users. The data covers the period between 2010 and 2012 for the first two variables, 
and the period between 2012 and 2013 for the remaining variables. 
 Figures 8 and 9 show the penetration rate of both Facebook and Twitter. It is noticeable 
that most of individuals in Arab countries tend to use more Facebook than Twitter as the highest 
penetration rate for this latter social media accounts for 7.6% in comparison to 28% for 
Facebook. 
 The number of individuals using social media is increasing each year in all Arab 
countries, with the highest number of Facebook users in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, and 
0
50
100
150
200
250
1
9
90
1
9
91
1
9
92
1
9
93
1
9
94
1
9
95
1
9
96
1
9
97
1
9
98
1
9
99
2
0
00
2
0
01
2
0
02
2
0
03
2
0
04
2
0
05
2
0
06
2
0
07
2
0
08
2
0
09
2
0
10
2
0
11
2
0
12
2
0
13
2
0
14
2
0
15
In
d
iv
id
u
al
s
Years
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) in Arab 
countries
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Mauritania
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
with the lowest values in Syria, Sudan, and Morocco. Concerning Twitter, it has the highest 
number of active users in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and the lowest 
values in Mauritania.  
Figure 10: Facebook Penetration in Arab countries 
 
Figure 11: Number of Facebook Users in Arab countries: 
 
 
Figure 12: Twitter Penetration in Arab countries: 
 
Figure 13: Number of active users in Twitter: 
 
 Nowadays, Arab economies are also using social media for professional use. LinkedIn 
for instance, which is a platform for job matching between employees and employers, have 
increasing trends regarding the penetration rate. The highest value for this latter variable is in 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain, but the highest number of users is in United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (Figures 14 & 15). The lowest values are in Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Algeria (Figure 14). 
 
 
 
Figure 14: LinkedIn Penetration in Arab countries: 
 
Figure 15: Number of LinkedIn users in Arab countries: 
 
The social media and networking hypothesis with intensive use of ICTs and mainly 
communicating means allow for more exchange of data and information. They also allow quick 
consultations for individual and collective decisions. This assumes that current generations are 
more connected locally and globally compared to their parents.  
Different topics related to the effects of social media on social and political changes 
have been developed since 2011. The most recent papers deals with new issues as related to 
forecasting of changes (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2014) and diffusion of protests (Kwon & 
Hemsley, 2017) with focus on political marketing (Kalliny, Ghanem,  & Kalliny, 2016). Other 
authors have mainly focused on the roles of social media as they relate to Egypt and Tunisia 
(Eltantawi and West, 2011; Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Muzammil, Will and Mazaid, 2011; 
Khondker, 2011). The case of the Arab Spring has been used also later by others such as 
Wolfsfeld1, Segev , and Sheafer, (2013) and Gerbanso (2012) who extends the social 
movements to include protests in Spain.  
These trends have led to the creation of the Center for International Media Assistance 
several months before the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries of the region. This 
has also led to the launching of the “Arab social media report” that is published annually since 
2011.  
Conclusion  
With relatively higher school attainment and low income mobility, the youngest 
segments of the population in the Arab world are enjoying increasingly the contributions of 
information and communication technologies. The higher level of geographic mobility in 
addition to higher levels of interconnections through social media offer new opportunities to 
the youngest generations in comparison with the oldest ones. Series of hypotheses are tested to 
show the distinctive features related to the new generations. Demographic, knowledge and 
education besides access and use of new technologies in addition to the connection in social 
networks do definitely characterize the newest generations. These features do affect the 
economic, social and political changes as perceived by the youngest segments relative to their 
parents. While these trends are also universal, the Arab countries appear to be experiencing 
more changes in the distinctive features such that the youth as a source of changes, would 
generate new waves of transformations in Arab societies. While the indicators related to 
governance seem to stay stationary, they do indicate that this political component is under the 
effect of both the democratization and the needs of the younger generations.  
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